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A Reporton JudicialEthics
By GRAYTHORON

While the ethics of the American judiciary cover
ABSTRACT:

a broad spectrum,both good and bad, the general over-all level
of judicial ethical performanceis relatively high. Most judges
are honest and honorable. Where dissatisfaction is apparent,
it is far more frequently directed at judicial competence than
at judicial integrity and ethics. Corruption, dishonesty, susceptibility to political pressure, and other ethical lapses are,
however, not unknown, and on very rare occasions have been
extremely bad. The ethical obligations of the judiciary extend
far beyond the basic essentials of honesty, impartiality, and
fairness. Judges must not only avoid evil or wrongdoing,but
must also avoid any appearance or suspicion of impropriety,
both on the bench and in private life. Selected ethical problems are identified together with some of the areas where
significant ethical lapses are to be found. While our judiciary
has done well in meeting its ethical obligations, improvement
is still needed. The best assurance for high ethical performance comes from insistence upon outstanding integrity from
those selected for judicial office.

Gray Thoron, LL.B., Ithaca, New York, is Professor of Law at the Cornell School.
In 1948, following several years of New York City law practice with Sullivan & Cromwell, he was appointed to the faculty of the University of Texas Law School. In 19541956, he was Assistant to the United States Solicitor General in the Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. In 1956, he came to the Cornell Law School as Dean and
Professor of Law, serving as Dean until 1963. He was one of three members of the Laporte Commission on Legislative Ethics, appointed in 1964 by the New York Legislature.
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A DEMANDING critic will never be
wholly satisfied with the ethical
performanceof any segment of any society. Our Americanjudiciary, both state
and federal, provides no exception. In
the area of judicial ethics, we can find, as
one would expect, a very broad spectrum
of both good and bad. At one end of
this spectrum, there are judges of unusual competence, devotion, and integrity, who more than meet our highest
aspirations for judicial performance.
At the opposite end, there have been
(though fortunately only rarely) some
outrageously shocking and callous instances of judicial corruption or dishonesty. In between, as most informed
observers will agree, we will find for the
vast majority of judges a relatively high
over-all level of integrity and ethical
standards, especially when compared
with the situation in so many other
areas of American life.
Public satisfaction with judicial performance depends on judicial competence as well as judicial honesty and
ethics. Both are essential ingredients
for an effective and respected judiciary.
To the extent that complaints are directed at the judiciary, they are far
more frequently aimed at the professional competenceand judgment of those
who serve on our courts than at their
ethics and honesty. Thus, the general
reputation of our judges for honor and
integrity appears to be substantially
greater than their reputation for ability
and learning. There have always been,
and still are, a great many thoroughly
honorable and honest men on the bench
throughout the country. There are,
however, far too few distinguishedcourts
and outstanding judges.
Although many suggestions have been
advanced for improving the caliber of
our judges, no ideal or wholly acceptable solution has yet been proposed. Experience has shown that we get our best
judges when those who are responsible
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for judicial nominations insist on candidates with strong professional and personal qualifications. The point to be
stressed here is that substantially less
improvement is needed in the area of
honesty and ethics than in the area of
professional competence and qualifications.
HONESTY AND CORRUPTION

The most basic question respecting
the ethical performanceof our judiciary
naturally relates to honesty and integrity. How honest are our judges? Of
all the ingredients of ethical performance, this is the most fundamental. The
general answer to this question must be,
as already indicated, a strongly affirmative one. In court after court, trial as
well as appellate, state as well as federal, our judges have shown themselves
to be on the whole thoroughly honest
and honorable individuals, fully deserving of the public confidence in which
most courts and most judges are generally held.
This is not to say that individual exceptions do not exist. Corruption and
dishonesty, though rare, are not unknown. In a well-known article published in 1931, the late Jerome Frank,
a respected and perceptive legal realist,
who subsequently served with distinction on the federal appellate bench,
bluntly stated: "Crooked judges exist.
'Fixed' decisions are realities."1 Unfortunately, this observation is still true.
One very recent example comes from
Oklahoma, where three judges of the
Supreme Court of that state were found
to have been involved in a bribery situation of the worst sort. This led to the
impeachment and removal of one of the
judges and to the resignation of another.
The third escaped removal from office
only because his term on the bench had
1 Jerome Frank, "Are Judges Human?", 80
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 17
(November 1931), p. 34.
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expired by the time his wrongdoing became known. Similar instances have on
occasion been found elsewhere.
In the same article, Frank also candidly recognized that a few who hold
judicial office are subject to some degree
of political control, "decid[ing] . . . the
way the boss tells [them] to decide."2
This is a charge that is heard periodically, especially in areas where relatively corrupt political machines have
dominated the process of judicial selection. In evaluating this charge, it is
difficult to separate fact from fiction.
I have personally discussed the problem
with a number of experienced and informed lawyers and judges in whose
integrity and judgment I have full confidence. I conclude that though the
charge is often made without real justification, there are occasions when it is
almost certainly valid. There are
judges, though again relatively few,
who have so handled themselves as to
raise reasonable suspicions that their impartiality and integrity fail to measure
up to the standards set by most of their
judicial colleagues. Any judge who allows himself to be approached or influenced by a political boss or clubhouse
leader with respect to a matter before
him, or who unduly favors a party with
special political connections, is a disgrace to the bench. There appear to be
few such morally deficient individuals
currently in judicial office. There should
be none.
The observations in the preceding
paragraph should not be understood as
in any way questioning the honesty and
integrity of the great majority of those
who owe their judicial office to a dominant political leader. On the whole,
judges so selected have not only shown
complete independence once they have
assumed judicial office, but also a thoroughly acceptable over-all level of ethical performance. Complaints are frequently heard that those responsible for
2 Ibid., p. 34.
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judicial nominations have tended to
allow political considerations to outweigh considerations of judicial fitness and professional merit. Such complaints, however, are usually directed at
the level of professional competency of
the politically selected candidate and
substantially less often at his integrity
or honesty.
A basic ethical requirement closely
related to honesty is fairness or impartiality. Judges must dispense evenhanded justice. This does not, however,
mean that every litigant can expect
every honest and fair-minded judge to
react the same way to any particular
matter. Judges with certain backgrounds and experience are prone to
have different approaches and sympathies in dealing with certain types of
litigation. Such policy-orientation is a
fact of life. Areas in which it has
played a significant role include the
personal-injury field, government regulation of business, civil liberties, matrimonial law, and the administration of
criminal justice.
Ordinarily, such differences in approach or sympathy involve no ethical
lapse or inadequacy. The issues which
judges must resolve are often complex
and novel. Closely balanced competing
policy considerations, each fully supported by a line of well-reasoned and
persuasive precedents, may be available
to justify a decision either way. Chief
Justice John Marshall, in the early days
of our federal judiciary, championed
one judicial philosophy, and his successor Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney
another. Similarly, different judges today can be expected to react in different ways to matters of current legal
controversy. All that we can ask of
each judge is that he make his decision
within the framework of our legal
system, and as honestly, fairly, and conscientiously as he can. It is possible,
however, that particular views or prejudices may be so strongly or passionately
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held as to make the holder unfit for
judicial office. Men of strong prejudices do not normally make good judges.
The problem with such individuals
would usually be one of judicial fitness
and temperament,rather than a matter
of honesty and integrity.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

The ethical obligations of the judiciary obviously extend far beyond the
basic essentials of honesty, impartiality,
and fairness. It is not enough that
judges avoid evil. They must also so
regulate their conduct, both on and off
the bench, as to avoid any appearance
of evil or impropriety. Our courts
would be rapidly brought into disrepute
if either the legal profession or the
general public should fail to have confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of those who hold judicial office. Such
confidencecan only be earned and maintained if the conduct and reputation of
our judges are beyond reproach. Suspicion of judicial impropriety can likewise seriously undermine public confidence in our courts and judges. Thus,
conduct which tends to give rise to such
suspicions must also be avoided.
High standards of professional morality and ethics stem primarily from individual conscience, and not from legislation. Nevertheless, most professions
have found it desirable to formulate
codes of acceptable professional conduct. Such codes involve no reflection
on the honesty and integrity of those
they seek to guide. Rather they recognize a strong professional ethical obligation to meet standards substantially in
excess of mere avoidance of dishonesty
or illegality.
Two such codes of general application
have been developed by the legal profession. In 1908 the American Bar Association approved its first Canons of Professional Ethics, following the lead of
certain state bar associations which had
promulgated such codes in the period
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between 1887 and 1906. In 1924, the
American Bar Association approved its
Canons of Judicial Ethics. The Committee which drafted the Canons for the
judiciary was composed of both judges
and lawyers, with United States Chief
Justice William Howard Taft as its
chairman. As their preamble states, the
spirit of these Canons should provide "a
proper guide and reminder for judges,"
and indicate "what the people have
a right to expect" from the judiciary.
These Canons deal not only with the
ethics of judicial performance on the
bench, but also with what is expected of
a judge as regards conduct in everyday
private life.
In evaluating the degree of adherence
to the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it is
helpful to refer at the outset to a 1952
report, preparedby Judges Orie L. Phillips and Philbrick McCoy as part of an
extensive survey of the legal profession
conducted under the auspices of the
American Bar Association. With respect to judicial conduct, this report
began the summary of its conclusions
as follows:
The answersas a whole [to a comprehensive questionnairedealingwith judicial
selection and judicial conduct], and the
general comments in particular,indicate
the healthyconditionof the Benchthroughout the nation,when measuredby the adherence of the judges to the Canons of
JudicialEthics which formedthe basis for
our inquiry. Judges are human,and it is
perhapsto be expected that there should
be some deviationsin every State. While
the Committee did not take a judicial
census, the impressionis strong that, in
proportionto the total numberof judges
in all states, there are relatively few
who fail to adhereto their oaths of office
or to faithfully discharge their judicial
obligations.3
At the same time it was recognized that
in certain areas, there appeared to be
3 Orie L. Phillips and Philbrick McCoy,
Conduct of Lawyers and Judges (Los Angeles:
Parker & Company, 1952), p. 151.
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"flagrant" disregard of the Canons "in
too many particulars," especially as a
result of "political pressures." Improvement in judicial conduct was referred to as an "imperative need" where
such lapses existed.4
PERFORMANCE
JUDICIAL
One important area in which ethical
performance is not always all that it
should be involves the matter of dignity,
restraint, patience, and good manners.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics wisely
admonish each judge to be temperate,
patient, considerate, and courteous and
to make it his duty to see that court
proceedings are conducted with fitting
dignity and decorum. Nevertheless,
some otherwise fine and competent
judges have been notorious for their
lack of patience, sarcasm, intemperate
outbursts, or harassment of counsel.
Such conduct may well be a normal
human response to the pressures of a
difficult trial or an overcrowded calendar, or to some apparent or actual impropriety or inadequacy on the part
of counsel. No matter how strong the
provocation, judicial behavior of this
kind is always regrettable. Bad manners, sarcasm, lack of civility or restraint, and intemperance of utterance
have no place on the bench under any
circumstances. Such conduct tends to
interfere with the fairness of the proceeding in which it occurs, and in a
number of instances has been a cause
for reversal on appeal. It also reflects
adversely on the judicial temperament
of the judge in question, and will
tend to undermine confidence in his
impartiality and fairness.
Bad manners and lack of patience on
the part of the judge are but one aspect
of the broader problem of maintaining
courtroom dignity and decorum. The
way in which the judge handles himself
necessarily has a vital impact on the
4 Ibid., p. 151.

atmosphere and tone of any trial over
which he presides. If the judge lacks
dignity, so will the trial. The judge
who permits a circus atmosphere in
cases before him, or who reaches for
personal publicity, is properly subject
to strong condemnation. Wherever
there is a loss of dignity, there is less
public respect for the fairness and integrity of the judicial process. The
Ruby trial in Dallas provides an unfortunate recent illustration of a case
where the judicial handling of the trial
appears to have fallen somewhat short
of the standards called for by the spirit
of the Canons.
A related matter, which is a subject
of great current controversy, involves
the propriety of televising trials. Canon
35 condemns this practice as involving
improper publicity, destructive of the
essential dignity and fairness of the trial
process. The United States Supreme
Court, by a five-to-four vote, in the
recent Billie Sol Estes case held that
the televising of the Estes trial operated
to deprive Estes of his constitutional
right to a fair trial,5 thereby giving
added support to the policy of Canon 35
in protecting the dignity and fairness
of the judicial process.
The Canons also properly stress the
importanceof judicial industry, promptness, attentiveness, and diligence. Instances come to mind of judges with
poor and undisciplined work habits.
There are judges who are notoriously
and needlessly slow in deciding some of
the matters which come before them.
There are also observable differences in
the degree of diligence shown by different judges. Habitual lack of punctuality is likewise specifically condemned
by the Canons. With some exceptions,
5Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The
Judicial Canons of the Texas Bar differ in
various respects from those of the American
Bar Association. Under the Texas Canons, the
matter of televising and photographing trials
is left to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.
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the bench appears to meet well its obligations in these respects. This is not
to say that judicial minds may not on
occasion wander when some verbose or
inept lawyer makes a confused or otherwise inadequate or dull presentation. I
am personally acquainted with a substantial number of judges in many different states. A very substantial majority of those I know, or whose work I
have had the opportunity to observe,
are conscientious, hard-working, and
thoroughly dedicated to meeting their
judicial obligations to the best of their
ability.
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

The problem of judicial disqualification arises periodically and has obvious
ethical implications. There are certain
instances where all agree that it would
be totally inappropriate for a judge to
hear some particular matter. No judge
should act on a controversy in which he
has a direct financial interest or in
which a near relative is a party.
Canons 13 and 29 so provide, as do
many statutes. Other instances, however, are not so clear. It appears to be
generally customary for a judge to disqualify himself if he owns stock in a
corporation which is a party to a case
before him. If his stockholding is very
small and in a very large corporation
with thousands of stockholders, his
financial interest in the outcome of the
case may be so small as not to require
disqualification, particularly where it
would be difficult or impossible to find
a substitute judge. Harder problems
arise in cases where a relative, or former
partner or firm, or a close friend whose
hospitality the judge has frequently enjoyed, appears as a party or counsel in
litigation before the court on which the
judge sits. Former clients who appear
as parties present a similar problem.
There is no easy answer to many of
the borderline problems in this area.
The solution in each case is customarily
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left to the individual judge's sense of
propriety, with the solution differing
somewhat from judge to judge. Sometimes a judge's decision not to disqualify himself gives rise to controversy,
as in at least one well-publicized instance involving a highly respected
member of the United States Supreme
Court who decided not to disqualify
himself when a former partner appeared
in a case before that court.6 The principal criticism there came from one of
the other judges on that court. The
answer should depend on a balancing of
the following factors: the judge's assessment of his own ability to retain his
objectivity and impartiality, custom, the
apparent degree of public belief that the
judge's decision would not be affected
by the specific relationship, and the
availability of a substitute judge. Where
no substitute judge is conveniently
available, the rule of necessity may
properly lead the judge to decide against
disqualification.
References have previously been made
to the political pressures to which the
judiciary may find itself subject. Probably more frequent than attempts to
control specific decisions are dictation or
quasi-dictation with respect to patronage matters. Judges have occasion to
appoint trustees, receivers, masters, referees, special guardians, and the like to
aid in the administration of justice. In
some areas these patronage appointments have tended to be used politically, and have not always gone to those
best qualified by reason of ability or
character. There have likewise been
instances of excessive judicial liberality
in awarding fees and allowances to such
appointees. Such practices are strongly
6 See
John P. Frank, "Disqualification of
Judges," 56 Yale Law Journal 605 (April
1947). Professor Frank's article contains a
very helpful analysis of the problems of
judicial disqualification and detailed information as to the disqualification practices of
judges throughout the country.
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condemned by Canon 12, but, nevertheless, still occur.

Another practice in-

volving substantial abuse has been the
appointment of unqualified law clerks
by some judges in response to political
pressures, a practice which neither improves the efficiencyof judicial performance, nor creates confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process.
A very difficult ethical problem has
recently been perceptively and candidly
discussed by Justice Charles D. Breitel
of the New York Judiciary.7 This is
the problem of the judge who without
the least improper motivation concludes
that justice in a particular case can only
be achieved by departing to some extent
from the result which would be required
if generally accepted legal principles
were applied. As Judge Breitel puts it:
"The judge knows that he is powerless
to do in law what he wants and intends
to do, for the sake of a justice he subjectively conceives and desires to
achieve." Stated another way, is it "ever
right to pursue the end even if the means
are traditionally unavailable."
In its crudest form judicial excess, especially at the trial level, may be accomplished by distortingthe findingsof facts,
not too much, but enough so that the
applicablerules of law will meet the needs
of justice as the judge conceives them.
Sometimes it will involve no more than
avoidinga statementin an opinionof the
real reasons for one's conclusions, thus
leavingcompletelyobscuredthe findingsof
fact or applicablerules of law on which
the determinationdepends. This is subjectivism, no matter how sincere, at its

that his duty is the application of general
law to particular instances, that ours is a
government of law and not of men, and
that he violates his duty as a minister of
justice under such a system if he seeks to
do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and
disregards the general law as he knows it
to be binding on him.
Many strong judges are not wholly satisfied by this traditional answer in individual cases where they believe that an
obvious injustice would otherwise result.
THE JUDGE'SPRIVATELIFE
The judge's ethical obligation is not
limited to what he does on the bench.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics properly
recognize that the judge's personal behavior in everyday life and in his nonjudicial activities may be a matter of
For example, there
public concern.
would be little respect for, or confidence
in, a member of the judiciary who was a
known alcoholic, or a corespondent in
a divorce action, or a flouter of traffic
laws, or who cultivated friendships with
and accepted hospitality from suspected
racketeers or women of doubtful morals.
As Canon 4 states:
A judge's official conduct should be free
from impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety; he should avoid infractions of
law; and his personal behavior, not only
upon the Bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach.

Such obligations are broadly recognized
by judges everywhere. While private
worst.8
scandal in judicial life is not unknown,
The traditional answer to this problem it is certainly rare. Perhaps the most
is found in Canon 20, where the judge observable deviations arise from the inis admonished
judicious use of alcohol, but even such
7 Charles D. Breitel, "Ethical Problems in cases are not too frequent.
the Performance of the Judicial Function,"
No matter how active politically a
Conferenceon Judicial Ethics, University of judge may have been before his elevaChicago Law School Conference Series, No. tion to the
bench, he should thereafter
19, October 22, 1964 (Chicago: University of
dissociate
himself from all partitotally
Chicago, 1965), pp. 69-73.
8 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
san activity. Canon 28 lays down clear
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guidelines. He must avoid making
political speeches, making or soliciting
contributions to party funds, endorsing
candidates for public office, participating in party conventions, or serving
on any party committee or as a party
leader. As this Canon states:
While entitled to entertain his personal
views of political questions,and while not
requiredto surrenderhis rights or opinions
as a citizen,it is inevitablethat suspicion
of being warpedby political bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active
promoterof the interests of one political
party as againstanother.
These standards have certainly been
effective in some areas, but not everywhere, in reducing significantly the degree of public participation by judges in
partisan political activity. Their spirit,
however, has not always been met as
completely as it should be. In New
York, for example, the Presiding Judge
of the Court of Claims resigned his post
several years ago to become Republican
State Chairman. Now it is reported
that he is under consideration for reappointment to the court of which he
was formerly a member. Such shuttling
between judicial and political office is
not to be encouraged.
Another area in which abuses sometimes occur is where the judge uses his
office as a springboard from which to
run for some elective nonjudicial office.
In some states, this practice is more
widespread than in others. Canon 30
states that should a judge
decideto becomea candidatefor any office
not judicial,he shouldresignin orderthat
it cannotbe said that he is usingthe power
or prestige of his judicialposition to promote his own candidacyor the success of
his party.
In most states, this Canon is pretty
generally honored, but again not completely. The most publicized example
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of a judge who flouted this Canon was
the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy,
who ran for the United States Senate
in 1946 while continuing to hold his
position as a Wisconsin circuit judge.
Judges also have special ethical obligations with respect to financial matters
and business ventures. For example,
Canon 26 admonishes judges not to
make personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation before their court and to
liquidate any such investments which
may have been made prior to the judge's
elevation to the bench. This Canon also
condemns the use of information coming
to him in a judicial capacity for speculative purposes, and speculation in securities by buying on margin. Part-time
judges, who are not forbidden to practice law, are alerted by Canon 31 to
be scrupulouslycareful to avoid conduct
in their practice by which they might
appear to be utilizing their judicial position to further their professional success. It would be totally inappropriate,
for example, for such a judge to practice
before other judges in a court of which
he himself is a member. Judges must
also make special efforts not to live
beyond their means and to avoid, as far
as possible, going into debt. As with
most other aspects of judicial ethics, the
judiciary generally appears to honor
these obligations.
In this survey, it has not been possible to do more than to identify briefly
some of the more important ethical
problems which face the judiciary and
to try to indicate a few of the areas
where significant ethical lapses are to
be found. On the whole, the performance of our judiciary in meeting its
ethical obligations has been good. It
can, however, be improved. In the final
analysis, high ethical performancecomes
from insistence upon outstanding integrity from those selected for judicial
office.

